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Interpreting Communist Systems and Their Differences  
in Operation and Transformation as Networks 
 




Why some party-states collapse and others don't? Why some transformations are 
accompanied by economic crisis while others by economic growth? Are first political or 
economic transformation strategic alternatives? This paper comprises the essence of the 
author’s comparative research on party-state systems in Europe and Asia embodied in a 
comparative interactive party-state model interpreted as network. Networks evolve during 
the decision-making process formed by the tightly intertwined dependency and interest 
promotion relationships among actors in the party, the state, and the economy. The model 
also describes the structural background of the different operation and transformation of 
party-state systems as specific patterns of power distribution in the network forging the 
different ways and instruments of self-reproduction, and different sequence, speed and 
conditions of system transformation.  
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A pártállami rendszerek működésének, átalakulásának 




Miért omlanak össze egyes pártállamok, míg mások tovább működnek? Miért kíséri 
gazdasági válság a rendszerátalakulást az egyikben és fellendülés a másikban? Stratégiai 
kérdés-e az, hogy előbb a politikai vagy a gazdasági átalakulásra kerüljön sor? Ez a 
tanulmány a szerző európai és ázsiai pártállami rendszereket összehasonlító kutatásainak 
esszenciája, amelyben e rendszereket interaktív hálózati modellként értelmezi.  A hálók a 
döntési folyamat során alakulnak ki a párt-, az állam-és a gazdaság döntéshozói között a 
folyamatban létrejött szoros függőségi és érdekérvényesítési viszonyból. A modell a 
pártállamok elétrő működésének és átalakulásának szerkezeti hátterét is leírja mint a 
hálóbeli hatalmi eloszlás sajátos mintázatát, amely eltérő működést és eltérő sorrendű, 
sebességű és feltételű rendszer átalakulásokat von maga után.   
 
Tárgyszavak: pártállami rendszerek, hálózatok, hatalmi eloszlás változatai, szelektív 
erőforrás-elosztás, gazdasági magatartás politikai racionalitása, átalakulás, Kína 
 





The transformation of party-state systems began either in political- or economic subfields at 
different periods. Party-states with different sequence of transformation were also 
regionally and culturally dispersed: political transformation first occurred in Europe and 
economic transformation first in China. Sequential difference, field of interest and regional 
dispersion attracted different groups of scholars with different focus dealing with the 
transformation of party-states: those interested in political reforms focused on European 
states and Russia, and those interested in economic reforms focused primarily on China. 
Owing to their different interest, their field of comparison remained regionally constrained 
and sequentially one-sided. Therefore, in content they rarely overarched, mostly as negative 
examples: for China experts the deep economic crisis in those states where political 
transformation occurred first and for the “transitologists” the steady authoritarianism in 
China where economic transformation was taking place first.  
In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the gradual de-legitimation of the c ommunist 
parties was followed by either gradual political transformation or sudden collapse 
accompanied by steep economic crisis. Owing to these characteristics, “Transition to 
democracy” and „transformational recession” became a hot topic for more than a decade in 
comparative literature (Aslund, 1993; Gelb, et al.  1994; Denglian, at al., 1997; Gomulka, 
1994; Sachs and Woo, 1997; Hellman, 1998; World Bank, 1998; Kornai, 1994)1. Despite 
regional closeness, those post-soviet states where political outcome of the transformation 
was far from democratic came to the fore of comparative interest only later as „orange 
revolutions” in 1998 to 2005 have occurred (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011). Since the Chinese 
political regime managed to escape from the domino effect of regime collapses, China was 
seldom analyzed in the Europe-focused comparative transitology literature, unless as 
parallel area studies. Instead, a new group of scholars “entered” the field to compare 
democratization in authoritarian capitalist systems of Latin America and Southern Europe 
with the waning socialist dictatorships (Lynn and Schmitter, 1995). Such expansion of the 
field however blurred the different system characteristics of capitalism and communism and 
the transformation of a political subfield within one system with a whole system 
transformation.2 On the other hand, China experts’ interest field also strongly deviated 
from that of “transitologists”. This is because China’s party legitimacy was only temporary 
shaken in the second half of the 1980s during the several rounds of decentralizing reforms. 
In that period, there was a sudden increase of resources in the economy due to dual-track 
                                                        
1 In more detail see in Csanádi, 1995. 
2 See the sharp and grounding criticism of Bunce revealing the basic inconsistencies of their 
standpoints and ideas (Bunce, 1995). 
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pricing that simultaneously amplified the chances for corruption in the politically 
monopolized power structure. At the same time the process brought internal power 
struggles to the surface that were incited by reforms and institutional efforts to separate the 
party from the state bureaucracy and the economy (Liu H., 2012). Growing discent and 
instability however was drasticly suppressed in 1989-1991 with the clamp-down of 
Tiannanmen square demonstrations, the curbing of internal power struggles, the revoke of 
thus-far political reforms and by the radical restrictions on economic reforms and of those 
actively backing them. From the early 1990s, after new economic reforms were 
implemented following a strong economic recession (a steep drop in GDP, in exports, 
imports and investments) due to overall restrictions, steady and fast macroeconomic growth 
was experienced.  Based on these facts, China economic policy experts and researchers 
focused on economic reforms and propagated the ideal sequence of reforms starting with 
economic rather than political changes, that induces macroeconomic growth rather than 
economic crisis, engagement in gradual reforms rather than shock therapy as propagated in 
Poland and Russia and in reforms from below rather than from above that failed in Hungary 
and in China (e.g. Qian and Xu, 1993; Wu, 1994; Walder, 1995; Qian, 1998; Tong, 1997; 
Woo, 1998; Shirk, 1993). Some of these scholars were explicitely or indirectly taking 
economic reforms in authoritarian systems strategically more viable than in democracy, and 
economic transformation first an issue of strategic choice.   
After a decade, the scientific interest on transition in Europe faded away and interests 
first shifted to the varieties of capitalism in post-socialist countries. Later, as global crisis 
swept over the world’s economies, attention in economics and comparative political science 
shifted to the dramatic consequences of global crisis both in Europe and Asia. However, the 
finally coinciding topic of research in both areas evolved at a time when comparison already 
lost common systemic ground.  
 
THE SYSTEMIC APPROACH 
This paper introduces a comparative model that puts the different operation and 
transformation of party-state systems on common systemic ground and reveals the 
structural background of the differences and its consequences. The Interactive Party-State 
(IPS) model is an empirically based, comprehensive approach. It serves for the better 
understanding of the power structure and and its dynamics, its instruments, sources and 
conditions of self-reproduction and transformation. It reveals the reasons of its gradual 
disintegration or sudden collapse, the role of reforms in the conservation and 
transformation of party-states, the structural background of their different development 
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paths and the role of external and internal constraints in those paths. The IPS model 
concentrates on the inner workings of the party-state and highlights the interaction of 
individual and institutional interests and behavior defined by a characteristic structural 
setting. Interactivity among actors and among those actors and the external environment is 
central to the model since it provides the characteristic dynamics of self-reproduction and 
transformation of the system. The IPS model also provides a chance to reveal the decision-
makers’ structural motivations during interaction. It also points to the structural 
inequalities driving to differences in bargaining capacities in resource extraction, 
distribution, resource attraction and resisting intervention during the reproduction and 
transformation process.  
The IPS model defines the self-similarity of the elements, connecting and operating 
principles that allow and constrain interactions, and evoke the politically rational 
motivations of economic behavior of decision-makers along different dimensions (time, 
space, and different levels of aggregation and conditions of the structure). It also reveals the 
self-similarity of traps that evolve from the politically rational character of the structure and 
operation that will lead to transformation.  It also provides a coherent evaluation of the 
specifics of the on-going Chinese system transformation process compared to the East 
European transformations based on the specifics of distribution of power. Specific patterns 
require different instruments of resource extraction and distribution, it reflects different 
time span in the frequency of hardening constraint of self-reproduction, attracts different 
sequence, speed and conditions of transformation and different sensitivity to same external 
pressures during operation and transformation.  
The analysis also reflects on widely recognized models on socialism. For example, it 
argues that as opposed to the IPS model, interactivity fails to gain emphasis in Kornai’s 
causal model on the operation of communist systems (Kornai, 1992, pp. 565-580) despite 
acknowledging mutual influences in several directions.  Since arrows in his model only 
point in one direction, its other end being the origin of its cause (Kornai, 1992, pp. 569-70), 
it cannot analyze the interactive impact each block has on all previous ones, neither on the 
interactivity of those factors within each block with the external environment and the 
consequences of this interactivity on the whole system. For example, while the 
consequences of „bureacratic coordination” include plan bargaining, paternalism, quantity 
drive, soft budget constraint and weak responsiveness to prices, it is unclear what 
consequences do these have on the self-reproduction of the system. Moreover, without 
interactivity the reasons of changes are unclear: how departure from the classical type of 
communist system is motivated, why crisis takes place in this model and why reforms 
emerge? Why and how do decentralization, disintegration, collapse and transformation of 
party-states result from this causal dynamics without internal and external interactivity and 
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what is the cause of the differences among socialist systems?The remaining paper is divided 
into the following chapters: the first deals with the structure of party-states, the second with 
the operation of party-states, the third with the structural specifics of different party-states 
and the conditions of shifting structural specifics, the fourth with the role of structural 
specifics in the dynamics of transformation and the fifth with the sensitivity of 
transformation to global dyanamics followed by the conclusion. 
THE NETWORK STRUCTURE OF PARTY-STATE SYSTEMS  
Economy and society are closely interlinked and have many facets. From our point of view, 
models dealing with this coupled system can be seen as  
(1) mathematical or descriptive, i.e., if it characterizes systemic properties and 
interactions through equations or by their verbal description.  
(2) models that elaborate on equilibrium or potential evolutional aspects, i.e., if the 
model deals with the features of the actual system or describes processes that change 
as time develops 
(3) analogical or detailed, i.e., if it deals with high level concepts such as control or 
feedback with a few parameters, or if the model treats the details of the networked 
society 
The role of networks in the society has been recognized over the years. Globalization and 
the increased speed of information exchange emphasize the role of network society (see, e.g. 
Castells, 2011). From our point of view, it is important to note that such networks change 
very slowly and influence the processes over longer time scales, including short term and 
longer term effects and feedbacks in the societal changes. The detailed description of the 
structure and the dynamics of such network are of utmost relevance for the understanding 
of economic-societal changes, including their constraints. 
Networks and their dynamical properties as an elaborate structure in party-state 
systems were described already in mid 1980’s (Csanádi, 1984). Peculiar features of these 
studies indicated fractal properties; namely that the network looked similar at different 
levels of aggregation, e.g., at the level of enterprises, at the level of districts, or even at the 
level of the Eastern Block, but also in time (at different periods) and in space (in different 
regions) (Csanádi, 1997). 
Due to the broadly accepted view that networks play a crucial role in our societies and 
that networks are relatively stable, the key features of the party-state networks as well as 
their subtle differences can have strong lasting influences on the behaviour and 
development of party-states.  
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In what follows, I describe the key components of the Interactive Party-State (IPS) 
model. The IPS model is a descriptive verbal model. The advance of network theory may 
lead to quantitative and thus predictive dynamical modelling in the future. Here, we 
elaborate on the details of self-similarities and differences of the structure and dynamics of 
this network in different communist countries and on the consequences of system 
transformation in these party-states.  
My methodology of building up the model as a network changed over time: first 
interviews, documents, circulars, archives and statistics provided the material for the 
empirical surveys tracing down the network in the Hungarian party-state during 1980-1989 
through case-studies on decision-making process; next secondary analysis of empirical and 
theoretical works on different aspects of party-state systems were interpreted from the point 
of view of general and specific features of the network, thereby extending the model to 
party-states in general; and later, in order to test the theoretical findings on the general and 
specific features of the structure, operation and transformation new empirical surveys were 
carried out during 2001 and 2013 in the Chinese party-state system.   
Party-state structures are generally taken as hierarchical and monolitic where society is 
clearly separated from state, so is politics from economics, ruling elite from working classes, 
the paternalistic state from the economic units. Thus economic behavior is economically 
rational but soft budget constraints are taken as uniform in these systems. The IPS model 
instead demonstrates the institutional background of blurred boundaries between the above 
dicotomies: 
• It reveals the elements, connecting and operating principles of a politically 
monopolized institutional structure where party as a political entity developpend into a 
social system.  
• It shows the different ways the characteristics of a hierarchical structure are overcome 
through the multiple closed channels of dependencies and interest promotion;  
o it points to the phantom mass behind bargaining capacities based on closed 
channels and the complexity of inequalities built in the network; through that  
o it points to the subtle stratification in this structure based on bargaining 
capacities within the the network comprising the whole society (Csanádi, 1997);   
• It reveals the political rationality of economic behavior in the selectivity of resource 
distribution, resource extraction and attraction and resistence to intervention, resulting 
in selectively soft constraints instead of generally soft to reproduce and improve 
bargaining capacities within the network. 
The complex nework structure of party-state systems represented by the IPS model can 
be described in terms of hierarchical structures and the links between them. It is composed 
of three interactive layers that incorporate each other: the party and state hierarchies, the 
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instruments of power of the party interlinking those hierarchies and the privileges of short-
cuts for some in the decision-making process. The first layer is the basic network structure 
(Figure 1) is made of the set of formal hierachies that are already specific to party-states: the 
party hierarchy monopolizes the political subsphere, the state (non-party) hierarchy 
monopolizes the economic sub-sphere and thereby both the extraction and distribution of 
resources and the instruments serving those. Still, in the this basic network structure, 
characteristics of hierarchies are clear: actors on one level are equally powerful towards 
lower levels and equally dependend of higher levels of the hierarchy,  dependency is 
unilinear, ie. there is no way to circumvent direct subordination levels for interest 
promotion. 
Figure 1  
The first layer: the formal hierarchies of the party-state structure 
 
An augmented network  evolves through the second layer, as the party, originally one 
entity in one subfield (political) monopolizes its own sub-field and stretches out its 
instruments of power to other sub-fields, permeating the boundaries on non-party 
organizations, and overlapping the decision-making process through positional structure 
(nomenklatura responsibility), activity structure (subject metter responsibility), 
organizational structure (instructor system) and individual decision-makers (party 
discipline of party members).3  
Figure 2 depicts the augmented network that incorporates the first one with the 
directions of dependencies providing the multiple ways and interest promotion.  Figure 3 
looks into the same in more detail based on empirical research done in Hungary in the 
                                                        
3 Instruments of party power and their functions are detailed in Csanádi, 1996 
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1970s and 1980s. The sketch contains the organizations within both hierarchies and the 
different power instruments that interlink those from the party hierarchy. 
 
Figure 2  
The second layer: the augmented network through the interlinking threads 
 
 
In the augmented newtwork, actors attached to interlinking lines are dependent on as 
many ways expectations or orders run through the channels of different power instruments 
of the party and the hierarhy. But, at the same time, interlinking dependency lines multiply 
the chances for interest promotion in as many directions as dependency lines are held in the 
party hierarchy, and allow to circumvent actors’ own hierarchy in several modes (Figure 2).  
Room for manoeuver in this figure depends on the number of interlinking lines attached to 
the actors (Figure 3): the more interlinking line an actor is attached to, besides more 
dependency, the larger the actor’s options for maneouvering. Consequently, interlinking 
lines not only allow for larger room for manoeuvre by circumventing direct subordination 
and multiplying channels of interest promotion, but also introduce structural inequalities in 
bargaining capacities among actors of the same level in the hierarchy depending on the 
number and strength of interlinking lines attached to the actor. Through interlinking lines 
direct sensitivity evolves towards each other at both ends of the channel: decisons taken in 
the party hierarchy may directly stabilize or destabilize actors in the economic subfield, 




Figure 3  
The hierarchical and the interlinking lines (traced empirically in Hungary) 
 
 
Note: hierarchical (D1) lines within party and state hierarchy; interlinking (D2) lines as instruments 
of Party power: No nomenklatura responsibility; Ins instructor system To subject-matter (topic) 
responsibility system; Pl party lieson system: coordination and consultation between branch 
ministries and local party organizations; Pe connections of party organizations in enterprises with the 
Personnel Department of the branch ministries concerning cadre issues Co regular consultation 
between enterprise pc and ministry pc; G interventions in the name of general economic policy 
responsibilities of the party; DP deputies in the Parliament with party membership; PC local party 
committees; pc party committees within organizations; CCC central controling committee; EPC 
Economic Policy Committee; DPMO Department of Party Mass Organizations; DIAT Department of 
Industry, Agricultureasn transportation; DEP Department of Economic Policy; MCCO Ministerial 
Councils’ Council Office; SPC State Planning Office; EC(S) Economic Committee of the State 
 
The augmented network is strengthened by a third layer: the network of shortcuts 
(Figure 4), that complements and incorporates the previous two layers and can efficiently 
influence the decision-making process (I3). Shortcuts will evolve into structural feedback 
loops within hierarchies through D1 dependency lines, or accross hierarchies through D2 
dependency lines (Figure 4) during the decision-makig process.4 Structural feedback loops 
                                                        
4 Short-cuts may occur occasionally e.g. an enterprise manager is invited to a ministerial level 
session where export strategy is developped as an important exporter to the Soviet Union, he may 
be part of the delegation of bilateral bargaining with the Soviet Union, or a strategic exporter to the 
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will introduce new structurally built-in inequalities in the capacity to promote interests „on 
the spot”. This is because short-cuts allow privileged actors to communicate with decision-
makers whom otherwise would never meet given the difference in the level of their formal 
position in the hierarchy; with short-cuts they may directly acquire and forward information 
that otherwise would be impossible or only through mediators, look into documents they 
would never access, meet higher level decisionmakers on party and state hierarchies they 
would never meet, participate in decisions they would never be able considering their 
formal position. Consequently, through structural feedbacks actors become able to directly 
and efficiently influence those decisions that would affect them, accumulate further 
connections and feed-backs, attract new resources, resist interventions or prepare for the 
unavoidable decisions, both within their own hierarchies and across the party hierarchy. 
Chances for short-cuts however are not uniform, this is the privilege of few whose properties 
and instability is able to provoke higher political sensitivity of those holding the dependency 
lines in both hierarchies. 
Figure 4  
The third type of linkages: the structural feedbacks (shortcuts) 
 
 
With the three layers that mutually incorporate each other, a complex party-state power 
network is formed (Figure 5). Elements of this network are: the Party hierarchy, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
West. Short-cut may be formed for or longer term, such as being appointed as key enterprise of 
long-term technical development programs, or providnig pre-plans for the medium or long-term 
national plan, or if they are important enterprises appointed for closer statistical monitoring by the 
central government or elected to the district, city or county level party executive (standing) 
committee, or that of the CC. 
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monopolizing the political sub-sphere, the state hierarchy, monopolizing the non-party sub-
fields, including economy, and thereby monopolizing the extraction and distribution of 
resources and the instruments serving those; the interlingking lines directly or indirectly 
through the state politically monopolizing dependencies and interest promotion (I2) and 
the feedback loops (I3), both providing structural inequalities of interst promotion. Thus, 
owing to I2 and I3, formal position in the hierarchy and bargaining position in the complex 
network differ. The network has closed channels and actors can efficiently utilize their 
channels independently that leads to atomization, i.e., non-synchronized dependency and 
interest promotion.  Consequently, actors’ bargaining capacities are obscure and can change 
quickly if their shortcuts or interlinking lines undergo changes.  In other words, behind each 
actor there is an indeterminate „phantom force” the partner can only guess (Csanádi, 1997, 
p. 30). In this network dependencies are unidirectional, but multi-threaded and so are the 
channels for the promotion of interests. At the same time, direct connections of party and 
non-party actors mantain high sensitivity to each others’ decisions.  
Figure 5   






THE OPERATION OF PARTY-STATES 
 
Elements and principles of connection will bring about characteristic principles of 
operation: since all actors have D1 lines, but only party actors have D2 lines interlinking all 
others in other subfields, dependencies and interest promotion as well as resource 
extraction and distribution are directly or indirectly (through state hierarchy) politically 
monopolized. 
In this politically monopolized structure actors are in dual position: They are 
simultaneously holders of and captured by dependency lines, thereby incorporating two 
functions: distributors and pleaders in one single entity.
5
 As monopolistic holders of the 
lines, they are able and simultaneously forced to intervene – otherwise losing bargaining 
position; As embraced by these lines they are exposed and simultaneously interested in 
keeping and multiplying dependency threads for interest promotion and in exchange 
accomodate to expectations – otherwise losing bargaining position. Capacity and force, 
exposure and interest together ensure the politically rational motivations of economic 
behavior for self-reproduction and thereby the cohesion and reproduction of the whole 
network. 
Owing to actors’ dual position and functions the capacity for self-reproduction is 
complex. One single actor as holder (intervener) of the lines has resource extracting and 
redistributing capacity and as embraced by those (pleader), has resource attracting and 
resisting capacities to interventions. These capacities together will provide the constraints of 
self-reproduction of an actor. However, constraints of self-reproduction are not uniform but 
selective: positional differences due to built-in inequalities – interlinking lines (D2, I2) and 
feedbacks (I3) – will forge selective chances (capacities) for resource attraction, extraction, 
allocation and resisting interventions. Consequently, actors’ selective chances according to 
structural bargaining capacities lead to selectively soft or hard constraints of self-
reproduction. Selectively soft and hard chances for self-reproduction challenges Kornai’s 
widely accepted paradigm on generally soft budget constraint of enterprises in communist 
systems (Kornai, 1980, 1992, Kornai et al. 2003). Since in case we nest budget constraints in 
the politically monopolized network of power relations it will turn out that budget 
constraints are selectively soft rather than generally soft. Validity of this argument no 
matter the space, time and different levels of aggregation is supported both by statistical 
analysis of maufacguring enterprises on national level in Hungary during 1970-1979 
                                                        
5 This argument counters Kornai’s where pleaders (enterprises) and distributors (paternalistic 
state) are separate entities (Kornai, Maskin, Roland 2003).  
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(Csanádi, 1997) or in China in 2008-2011 among manufacturing enterprises at city level 
(Csanádi and Liu, 2012). According to the surveys, chances radically increase if enterprise 
size at national and local level, the level of integration into the network and in the Chinese 
case state owneship of enterprises are considered. Thus, empirical results support the 
structural background of the selectivity of soft budget constraints nested in power relations 
within the network (Csanádi, 1997). Selectively soft constraints are politically rational, 
according to bargaining capacities. This distribution characteristics will have crucial 
consequences on actors’ behavior and on the reproduction of the whole system. It will bring 
about politically rational fixed paths of resource distribution; politically rational selectively 
soft reproduction constraints; this will conclude in politically rational motivations of 
economic behavior: the strive for growth, for resources and for cummulated integration (I2, 
I3) into the decision-making network and political adaptation in order to achieve this goal. 
These circumstances provide a structural motivation and system characteristics to actors’ 
behavior rather than relyig on „natural instincts” of enterprise managers for growth and 
power argued by Kornai (1980, pp. 78, 204-206). The steady structural motivations for 
growth and thereby to reproduce and improve bargaining capacity to be further privileged, 
and the repeated allocation of resources according to politically rational rather than 
economically rational criteria forge the structural (Csanádi, 2013) and those of occasionally 
meeting hard reproduction constraints of the whole network ending up in repeated 
investment cycles (Csanádi, 2014).  
 
POLITICAL CONCERNS VERSUS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN THE 
NETWORK 
We may conclude from the so-far analytical description that both structure and operation 
are based on political concerns: the rationale of connecting subfields, the instruments for 
connection and the concerns of in-built inequalities. Based on the politically constructed 
network also factors of self-reproduction of the structure are politically motivated: the 
principles of operation; dependencies, interest promotion and resource distribution; the 
criteria of selection and -- based on that -- the fixed paths of resource distribution, the 
selectively soft/hard reproduction constraints and the politically rational economic 
motivation and behavior (accumulating feedbacks and drive for growth). In sum, the 
reproduction of the whole network is politically motivated. In this politically motivated 
structure and operation economic efficiency constraints and motivations for efficiency in 
self-reproduction will be lacking both individually and for the whole structure. Instead, 
structural constraints – that is, the given distribution of power (atracting and resisting, 
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extracting and allocating capacities) – determine the hardness or softness of reproduction 
constraints, both for individuals, units and the net as a whole. Thus, since economic 
behavior is politically rational instead of economically and power distribution rather than 
economic efficiency determines the hardening constraints of self-reproduction, the process 





SENSITIVITY TO EXTERNAL DYNAMICS: THE INTERPLAY OF EXTERNAL 
AND INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
Efficiency constraints external to the network and specific structural (reproduction) 
constraints internal to it are strongly interdependent through the dynamics within and 
outside the network. If efficiency (budget) constraints are soft (e.g. external loans and FDI 
flow easily, competitive pressures are low, export demand is high import conditions are 
favorable), resources entering the network from outside of it are flexibly “form-fitted” 
according to power relations. Thus reproduction constraints remain soft and soft external 
constraints contribute to the conservation and reproduction of the given power relations. 
These conditions prevail until efficiency constraints exerted by the external environment 
and reproduction constraints defined by internal power distribution are soft for self-
reproduction. If structural constraints in self-reproduction are met and resources from 
higher aggregation levels flow poorly, structural constraints become hard and exposure to 
external factors arise and importance of external constraints exerted from outside the net 
emerges. When both external and structural constraints become hard, adaptation pressures 




                                                        
6 The logic of this process was analyzed in the case of the Soviet Union when Eastern Bloc turns 
from assets into devastating liabilities of the Soviet empire leading to possible self-consumption 
was desribed by Bunce already in 1984, years ahead of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc.   
7 Stimulus package introduced in late 2008 in China was the direct adaptive consequence of an 
external shock caused by the global crisis and the subsequent internal government reaction in the 
form of intensified state intervention that mobilized economic actors. New chances for resource 
distribution and investments through state intervention have mobilized characteristic distribution 
priorities of the system according to the size and extent of integration of economic units into the 
network. Chances similarly mobilized the politically rational economic behavior of actors to hoard 
resources and invest leading to investment overheating (csanádi, 2013) 
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THE COMMON GROUNDS OF PARTY-STATES: THE SELF-SIMILARITY IN 
THE IPS MODEL  
Concluding the above, we now may define the concept of party-state systems based on the 
IPS model by combining the structural and the dynamic characteristics. The party as one 
political entity in one sub-field (political), by monopolizing the political subfield and the 
non-party subfields through its instruments of power, evolves into a politically monopolized 
institutional power structure embracing and infiltrating all other sub-spheres of the society 
structurally determining its inequalities. Thus, the network as an institutional power 
structure operates as a social system. In this social system, no matter the time, the space or 
the level of aggregation - enterprise level or the Soviet block (Csanádi, 2006) the political 
concerns of building the structure and its structural and dynamic consequences are self-
similar.
8
 The system’s self-similar characteristics are: the elements,  the principles of 
connection, the principles of operation, the in-built inequalities, the structural duality of 
decision-makers’ functions, the political rationality of interest and behavior fed by the 
political rationality in the selective distribution of resources and the subsequent selectively 
hard/soft reproduction constraints of actors according to political rationality, the according 
structural motivations for the drive for growth and for embeddedness in the network that 
leads to overheating and thereby to the occasional meeting of hard reproduction 
constraints, and the traps of self-reproduction owing to the lack of efficiency constraints  in 
strong interaction with the external environment, in case both hard, leading to 
transformation. These self-similar structural and dynamic characteristics forge the common 
basis of party-state systems that may be found within each system at different level 
aggregations, and in space among systems and in different times of their existence. 
 
THE STRUCTURAL BACKGROUND OF THE DIFFERENCES  
If so many factors contribute to self-similarities and these prevail in time, space and levels 
of aggregation than why did and do party-states operate and transform so differently? Is 
there a systemic explanation to these differences? The IPS model offers a comprehensive 
explanation of the varieties of party-state systems despite self-similarities.  A more thorough 
look on the self-similar elements of the structure, one discovers that these elements may 
                                                        
8 The IPS model’s self-similarity concept was one of the key explanatory factors applied by Bunce 
(1999) to describe the similarities in the design and destruction of socialism and the state in the 
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. 
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vary in time, in space and different levels of aggregation while principles of connection and 
operation remain constant. So is the strictness and depth of D1 lines in both hierarchies, the 
level of centralization or decentralization of discretions over interlinking lines along the 
party hierarchy, the level of centralization or decentralization of the discretion over resource 
extraction and allocation along the state hierarchy and the density, accumulation, origin 
and arrival of feedbacks in the party or state hierarchies and across hierarchies (Csanádi, 
2006).
9
 Taking all together, the combination of the variations of the structural elements will 
present the innumerous variety of power distribution. Differences occur both in time (e.g. 
Hungarian power distribution before and after 1956 revolution), in space (e.g. the 
Romanian and Chinese power patterns in the 1980s) and different level aggregatios (e.g. at 
township or provincial level in China in 1990s after local elections).  
Varieties of power distribution involve different extent and distribution of resisting and 
attracting capacities of actors within the network that bring about different frequency of 
meeting hard constraints of self-reproduction of the structure as a whole, that requires 
different instruments of resource extraction and distribution that will conclude in different 
paths of self-reproduction and different paths of transformation.  
 
PATTERNS AND PATTERN CONFORMING TRANSFORMATIONS 
Differences may be grouped into three characteristically different patterns of power 
distribution: the Self-exploiting, Self-disintegrating and Self-withdrawing patterns (Table 
2). Each one of the names suggests the network’s structural and operational traps that lead 
to system transformation.  
Within those patterns a wide variety of structures may be found but with the same main 
pattern characteristics. The table is composed by the structural characteristics and the 
dynamics these characteristics incite: the pattern of power distribution, the instruments of 
                                                        
9 In more detail: strictness of dependencies within the hierarchies may be different as well as their 
depth (e.g. compulsory planning in the 1950s in many party-states, or indirect panning in Hungary 
in late 1960s); Interlinking dependency lines (D2) may origin at different levels of the party 
hierarchy, (e.g. centralized in Romania until the late 1980s or North Korea until presently, 
relatively decentralized in China since the 1960s); interlinking lines may be dense or scarce, may 
overlap more or less sub-speres (e.g. in Poland agriculture was not overlapped by interlinking 
threads, while in China even streets were under the surveillance of the party through interlinking 
lines in the 1960s), within those the density of organizations reached in non-party hierarchy;  
variation in the level of discretion over resource extraction and distribution in the state hierarchy 
(centralized in all countries in the 1950s, presently in North Korea and decentralized to date 
through Mao’s campaigns during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution); strength of 
feedbacks may also vary, depending from where they origin in the formal hierarchy, which level 
they reach within their own hierarchy or across in party hierararchy, how dense they are, how  
cummulated they are, etc. 
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resource extraction and distribution the given pattern allows as a result of actors’ resisting 
and resource attracting capacities, that will determin the frequency the whole pattern meets 
hardening reproduction constraints that invite new pattern-conforming measures that 
result in characteristic ways of development and transformation.  
According to this table, Self-exploiting pattern is characterized by centralized origin of 
interlinking threads in party hierarchy, centralized discretions of resource extraction and 
distribution in state hierarchy, and weak and scarce feedbacks from economic sub-field. 
This pattern was characteristic to any party-state in the 1950s and still applies to North 
Korea. Here resisting capacities are low, the system may reproduce itself through forced 
resource redeployment until the physical capacities of the society and the reproduction of 
the whole system rarely meets hardening structural constraints, while tensions may increase 
high in the society. In case case this pattern meets hardening structural constraints, external 
resources may substitute internal resources for self-reproduction, or new forced resource 
redeployment is implemented through redistribution of power. If both external and internal 
constraints become hard, pattern-conforming measures escalate until sudden collapse. 
In the Self-withdrawing pattern interlinking lines in the party hierarchy are relatively 
centralized, resource extraction and distribution is centralized while feedbacks are strong. 
This pattern evolved in Hungary after the transitory collapse of the Self-exploiting pattern 
in 1956, or during Breznev’s reign, following the chaos in the self-exploiting pattern  and 
destabilizing power struggles after Stalin’s death and Kchruschev’s activity and demotion. In 
this pattern, resource attracting and resisting capacities are strong and efforts for forced 
resource redeployment are inefficient (form-fitted). In order to keep the pattern’s cohesion 
different type of resource extracting and distributing measures are needed. Decentralizing 
reforms within the network are introduced that provide the pattern-conforming 
instruments for self-reproduction. However, owing to the higher resisting capacities of 
those with feed-backs, their incessant politically rational motivations for growth and the 
political rationality of selective distribution, reproduction of the pattern meets hardening 
structural constraints more frequently than the centralized pattern. Until external sources 
flow the system form-fits those to the given pattern distribution without the need for 
changing status quo. However, if both external and structural constraints become hard, this 
brings about decentralizing reform escalation within the network without efficiency 
increase, causing recession spiral, loosening cohesion or the network, and declining party 
legitimacy and thereby political transformation first. 
In the third, Self-withdrawing pattern origin of interlinking threads is relatively 
decentralized in the party hierarchy, and so is the capacity for resource extraction and 
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distribution, while also feedbacks are strong.
10
 This pattern evolved in China during Mao’s 
repeated decentralizing campaigns (through forced resource redeployment) when also state 
owned enterprises were subordinated to different local levels of the state and party 
hierarchy, disrupting the self-exploiting pattern to annihilate potential competitors to his 
power in the center. Since exposure to central resource distirubtion in this pattern is 
weaker, while resisting and resource attracting capacity is stronger, neither forced resource 
redeployment, nor decentralizing reforms provide sufficient resources for the center to 
reproduce the system. Both forced resource redeployment and decentralizing reforms are 
form-fitted. Owing to structural specifics the pattern meets hardening constraints of self-
reproduction and loss of cohesion of the strucrure even more frequently than the other two. 
In the loss of cohesion new, pattern conforming measures are born by leaping out of the 
structure and allowing the competitive field to expand that provides growing external 
resurces for the reproduction of the pattern. The gradual expansion of the economic field 




Table 1  
Main patterns of power distribution 
 
                                                        
10 The prevalence of this distribution of power to date in contemporary China is indirectly 
supported by Lin, (2011), Szamosszegi and Kyle (2011) and Khoo (2012) in their analysis on the 
institutional structure and control of state-owned enterprises. 
11 For resons of extension the mechanisms are simplified and historically less grounded. Detailed 
description of the patterns and empirical support on Romanian, Hungarian and Chinese pattern 




CHANGES WITHIN PATTERNS, PATTERN SHIFTS AND SYSTEM 
TRANSFORMATIONS  
Patterns may reproduce themselves in roughly the same power distribution but also 
changes to different extent in the distribution of power may occur (i) within patterns 
bargaining capacities reflected by the distribution of power may vary in time, in space, and 
at different levels of aggregation of the network, while the network itself keeps its main 
pattern characteristics. (ii) However, if main pattern characteristics change, the pattern 
itself will change.
12
 Precondition of pattern shifts is a transitory collapse, but not all 
transitory collapses conclude in pattern shift, as patterns may regenerate in the original 
form (iii) If main structural elements, connecting and operating principles that compose the 
system wane, system transformation will occur in those patterns.  
 
PATTERNS AND INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS 
Changes in the patterns are strongly intertwinded with internal and external dynamics.
13
 
Different patterns are differently sensitive and resistent to external and internal pressures 
(shocks) be these simultaneous or alternative. In case external constraints are soft while 
structural constraints become hard, no adaptation pressures emerge: reproduction 
constraints remain soft in all patterns. In case external constraints become hard, adaptation 
pressures emerge and instruments of adaptation are pattern-conforming. Sensitivity of 
patterns is reflected in the responsiveness to the pressures for adaptation to external and 
internal shocks. The pattern will determine the resisting capacity of actors against increased 
internal resource extraction in case of hard external resource constraints. The lower the 
capacity to resist, the higher is the capacity to extract further resources from within. From 
                                                        
12 In China, pattern shift was caused by Mao Zedong’s repeated decentralization campaigns that 
resulted in temporary collapses of the self-exploiting pattern. By the time Deng Xiaoping took over 
the power, the episodically evolving pattern shift finally stabilized in the self-withdrawing pattern of 
power distribution. In Hungary, pattern shift from self-expoliting to Self-disintegrating occurred 
after the temporary system collapse during the 1956 revolution.  
13 External pressures from the point of view of the system’s operation are for example the death of 
Stalin in 1953, the domino collapse of the European communist systems in 1989-1991 for China and 
Vietnam, the Asian crisis at the end of 1990s, or the global crisis by the end of 2008. Internal 
shocks are for example: the death of the country’s authoritarian leader as of Gheorghiu-Dej in 
Romania in 1965, or that of Mao in 1976; Mao’s decentralization campaigns during his reign; 
popular uprisals in the early and mid-1950 in Eastern European party-states and the Tiananmen 
Square events in China in 1989; or the periods of dramatic shortage of resources to distribute 
within the network. 
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this point of view, structurally the least sensitive is the self-exploiting, the most sensitive is 
the self-withdrawing pattern (Csanádi, 2006).  
External and internal adaptation pressures may prevail for different periods. Thus, not 
only pattern differences but also the varying time-span of the impact will influence 
sensitivity and responsiveness, defining adaptation. Differences in the sensitivity and 
responsiveness to external and internal adaptation pressures emerge not only in time or 
according to time-span, but also in space and among different aggregation levels. All these 
impacts may occur at different stages of operation of the system: both during the period of 
self-reproduction, when main system and pattern characteristics prevail, and during sytem 
transformation, when system and pattern characteristics gradually wane while the main 
traits of another system emerge. Adaptation may end up in the restructuring of power 
relations without changing patters (regeneration). They may also conclude in changing 
patterns or may also lead to transformation. According to the model and historical 
experiences, regeneration of the system is allowed if only one, either external or internal 
reproduction constraints of the system gets hard, while the other remains soft. Pattern shifts 
occur when simultaneous external and internal pressures force the collapse of the system, 
but pressures last for a short period, and, therefore, collapse is temporary and regeneration 
is possible. Historically, we only have examples for a shift from the self-exploiting pattern to 
self-disintegrating and self-withdrawing ones. Independent of pattern characteristics, 
transformation is likely to begin when both external and internal constraints become hard 
and they persist for longer time, but reactions are pattern conforming:
14
 escalation of 
pattern-conforming instruments, lead to pattern-conforming transformation.  
 
PATTERN-CONFORMING SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION 
The systemic transformation process evolves as the party-state network is retreating as a 
social system from monopolized sub-spheres, and the sub-spheres of a new social system 
are emerging outside of the network. Transformation may be absolute, when physical 
changes in the network occur: bargaining through the channels declines (the network is 
emptied), weakened, constrained, or cut off. Transformation may be also relative, when 
either the network does not retreat but emergence and expansion of the new subfiled 
external to it (political or economic) is in process, or the speed of retreat is faster than the 
                                                        
14 Alternative or simultaneous external and internal constraints and their different duration may 
explain the different government reactions in similar patterns at different periods, as well as 




speed of emergence, or both are expanding but the speed of emerging subfild is higher. The 
dynamics of relative or absolute retreat and emergence develop in strong interaction. 
Variations in the absolute and relative dynamics of transformation and their combinations 
will present different types of transformation dynamics that may show different spatial 
configurations at different levels of aggregation (Csanádi, Gyuris, Lai, 2009, Csanádi and 
Liu, 2012).  
Different tranformation dynamics are influenced by multiple individual historical, 
cultural, economic geopolitical reasons but have also multidimensional system 
characteristic factors that interplay with those. Such are: differences among patterns, 
differences within patters, differences due to the density and strictness of intertwine 
between aggregation levels (the strictness within the hierarchy) and the different dynamics 
of the external enviornment. All these individual, structural characteristics and timing will 
influence the differences in the sequence, speed and conditions of transformation. The 
higher the resisting capacity of actors, the more frequent the occasions of hardening 
constraints of self-reproduction of the system and the stronger is the escalation of pattern-
conforming instruments during adaptation that contribute to the evolution of system 
transformation.  The higher frequency of meeting hardening constraints and adaptation 
pressure the more gradual the transformation process will be. Oppositely, the lower the 
resisting capacity, the less frequently the system meets hard constraints of self reproduction 
inciting adaptation, the more abrupt the initials of transformation will be.  
Depending on the pattern, the sequence of system transformation may be the following: 
in the self-disintegrating pattern political transformation takes place first; in the self-
withdrawing pattern economic transformation will occur first, while in the self-exploiting 
pattern political and economic transformations overlap each other. Regarding the speed of 
transformation: it may occur gradually or abruptly (gradual in case economic or political 
transformation begins before the other one, abrupt if the transformation of economic and 
political sub-spheres overlap in time). Sequence will determine the conditions of 
transformation: if economic transformation is first, as in the self-withdrawing pattern of 
China since the early 1990s, it will take place gradually and under authoritarian rule and 
under economic growth conditions. In case political transformation is first as in the self-
disintegrating pattern of Hungary from the late 1980s, it will evolve gradually under 
democratic regime accompanied by economic crisis. If they overlap and they are abrupt, as 
in the self-exploiting pattern of Romania, both economic and political outcomes are 
uncertain owing to long-stretched economic crisis (Csanádi, 2006, 2011a). Patterns also 




Below we shall roughly detail the sequence, speed and conditions in process of 
transformation according to the three main patterns of power distribution. Figures a, b, c 
reflect the pattern-characteristics of transformation during the retreat of the network and 
the emergence of the characteristics of the new patterns. Figure 6/a visualizes the sequence, 
speed and conditions of transformation in the Self-exploiting pattern. In this pattern, 
sequence is hard to define since owing to the abrupt collapse of the network attached to all 
subfields, tranformation of economic and political subfields is overlapping, Due to sudden 
and overlapping collapses political and economic outcomes of the system transformation is 
uncertain, factors of retreat and emergence are indiscernible, while macroeconomic crisis is 
deep and long-stretching. Figure 6a/b/c vizualizes the apocaliptic conditions and cumulated 
uncertainties of transformation (Bunce, Csanádi, 1993). 
Figure 6/a,b,c  




Figure 7/a reflects the characteristic sequence, speed and conditions of transformation 
in the self-disintegrating pattern. In this pattern political transformation is first, changes 
are gradual. Since economic transformation is second, thus economic transformation 
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develops under democratic political regime while political transformation develops during 
macroeconomic crisis. 
Figure 7/a  
Nature of system transformation in the Self-disintegrating pattern 
 
  
Figure 7/b involves the gradual metamorphosis of the party reversing from a social 
system into a political entity. Factors are inherent to this dynamics of retreat of the network: 
first the escalation of decentralization process takes place within the network directly 
sensitive to economic crisis generally to get rid of the responsibilities, while party is losing 
legitimacy owing to repeatedly failed economic reforms to curb recesssion spiral. 
Decentralization takes place among the discretions over economic units within the state and 
party hierarchies.
15
 The network was also emptied as cohesion losened and interactivity 
caused lower expectations to attract resources within the net declined, and competitive staff 
of the party and state fled the apparatus to find new jobs and new party membership in the 
expanding political field outside the network. As distributive capacity through the net 
wained, also vertical and interlinking lines were withdrawn as functions and positions in the 
party were abolished. Without functions, these moves were followed by the dissolution of 
the party apparatus once holding the interlinking lines, while in the party power struggles 
                                                        
15 For example, such were the new system of enterprise management system where candidates for 
enterprise managers, after being listed by local were elected by workers and staff of the enterprise,   
instead of being appointed by the supervising ministry. 
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cristallized and horizontal platforms were allowed. The dissolution of the apparatus was 
followed by the abolition of the communist party and members released thereby completing 
the metamorphosis of the system backways, turning into two political parties -- a reformist 
and a conservative.    
Figure 7/b  
The components of the retreating network 
 
Figure 7/c deals with the factors of evolving and expanding new political sub-sphere 
both external to the retreating network and within the space that emerged among the 
broken lines of the network. This process was in tight interaction with the retreating 
network from the monopolized political sub-sphere as a result of forced but inefficient 
adaptation to the internal and external economic pressures. First horizontal groups were 
allowed to emerge outside the network, such as NGO-s, later pressure groups, and later 
their reorganization into historic or new political parties. These latter were founded or 
joined by former party members or staff who have left the network. Extra-parliamentary 
forces and reformist wing decided over the introduction of crucial democratic laws reqiring 
two-third majority in the future voted by the old parliament under external pressure before 
its dissolution, multiparty-system was officially  introduced, free elections were held, new 





Figure 7/c  




Figure 8/a reflects the metamorphosis of the party-state system while retreating first 
from the economic sub-field (both agriculture and industry). In this pattern, the speed of 
economic transformation is gradual, the process of economic transformation is occurring 
under authoritarian rule, while owing to the expanding competitive field macroeconomic 
growth takes place forging the external sources for the self-reproduction of the remaining 
network. Both macroeconomic growth and self-reproductions of the network render 




Figure 8/a  
Nature of system transformation in the Self-withdrawing pattern 
 
 
Owing to the interwined and self-similar structural and operational characteristics of 
the system as a network, factors and processes of retreat and emergence in the economic 
sub-sphere resemble those in the political sub-sphere (Figure 8/b). Retreat of the network 
may be traced in different sub-sectors of the economy. Network retreated first from grass-
roots agriculture by cutting dependency lines with the dissolution of production 
cooperatives, the creation of individual responsiblity system (household responsiblitiy 
system) and also the withdrawal of the network by gradually narrowing fixed prices of state 
procurment and that of the number of pruducts falling under it and inplicitely allowing the 
expansion of migration despite the conservation of local hukou system. Meanwhile (Figure 
8/c) dual-track pricing regulations were created that allowed producers to sell their over-the 
plan products on market prices that contributed to market expansion in agricultural 
products. The retreat of the network was gradually taking place also in the the industry.
16
 
Here too, the process begun with decentralization of decisions within the network for 
bringing decisions to the level of production in marketing, production, investment decisions 
and expansion plans, and staff (enterprise and manager responsibility system) and provided 
profit retention opportunities. Later competitive capital, manpower and organizations 
empty the network to join the expanding market sphere, at the same time alternative 
                                                        
16 Dual track pricing means that both peasants and industrial enterprises may sell their over-the-
plan products on market prices after fulfilling the compulsory plan requirements. 
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capital, actors and interests enter the network (joint ventures, shareholdings, Peoples’ 
Parliament, inter-ministerial committees etc.) formally and informally weakening the 
influence of the party on the economy through the network while expanding party’s 
informal and formal influence on the private sphere. Former distributive functions were 
withdrawn from lower levels allowing enterprises greater freedom in deciding about 
investments up to a certain volume. The network has been increasingly cut through 
privaitzation, close-down and bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises, leaving the direct 
interlinking and hierarchical lines in limbo. 
Figure 8/b  
The components of the retreating network 
 
Taking the factors on Figure 8/c besides dual track system, further expansion of the 
market was allowed by „opening up” attracting resources from the global economy but also 
from outside the network both investing in the economy overlapped by the network and 
external to it. New private enterprises (both domestic and foreign) were allowed to be set 
up, increasing number of special economic zones and investment friendly laws attracted 
foreign capital contributed to the further expansion of the market sphere besides privatized 
enteprises and transferred (strip of) capital, organization and manpower, including the fast 
growing number of migrants absorbed by the fast expanding competitive sphere. 
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Figure 8/c  
The components of the emerging field 
 
The process of transformation is not a continuum in direction or speed: it may speed up, 
slow down and even temporary reverse under alternative or simultaneous external and 
internal pressures for adaptation.
17
 Dynamics of transformation may change temporary in 
space, in time and among different aggregation levels, and may influence the interrelated 
dynamics of absolute and relative transformation (Csanádi, 2006, 2009, 2011a, 2011b; 
Csanádi & Liu, 2012). Empirical reseach results reveal that despite China’s substantial 
transformation towards a market economy, the occasional need for increased state 
intervention has mobilized the characteristics of the party-state system at all aggregation 
levels temporary increasing the expansion of the network. Therefore, disparities in the 
dynamics of transformation may be detected also at subnational levels of the network 
(Csanádi & Liu, 2012). Thus, the different sensitivity and adaptation of lower level units 
                                                        
17 In the case of China this phenomenon after 2008 took shape in the selective allocation of central 
and local budgetary and bank resources to enterprises in the construction sector, with preference 
given to large-size and state-owned enterprises in the implementation of the stimulus package 
(Wong, 2010; Csanádi, 2011, 2012). The level of aggregation (location) for higher activity was 
defined by the specifics of the decentralized Chinese system along the intertwined institutional 
party-state structure (Table 2) and respective distribution of responsibilities and chances to extract 
and allocate resources. Systemic characteristics and their Chinese specifics together resulted in 
investment overheating and steadily growing local indebtedness through large and state-owned 
enterprises and local governments. This process was further amplified by characteristics of the 
transforming economy in China as the increased input demand of enterprises privileged by the 
systemic priorities of state intervention mobilized actors in the private sphere. Mobilization 
reversed again the dynamics of transformation speeding up the expansion of the market sphere 




may change the spatial configuration of the dynamics of transformation at different periods 
on the given level. Such characteristics were demonstrated in the early and mid 2000 in the 
transforming Chinese self-withdrawing pattern (Csanádi, Lai & Gyuris, 2009). 
 
CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the institutional structure of party-states in the IPS model may be described 
as a network born from the dependency and interest promotion relationships of actors 
during the decision-making process. The network not only embraces formal bureaucratic 
rules, procedures, outcomes of a hierarchical structure, but also the institutional ties 
binding party, state and economic actors across hierarchies.  The IPS model reveals the 
interrelation of the political, bureaucratic and economic fields through individual 
interactions of decision-makers in party-state systems. Thus, the IPS model simultaneously 
involves individual actors and institutions, and provides both the structural basis and the 
dynamic consequences of their interactions. These relationships evolve along self-similar 
structural elements, connecting and operating principles, embracing self-similar selectivity 
in resource distribution and structural motivations of economic behavior in time, in space 
and in different levels of aggregation of the network. The same network characteristics allow 
us to combine self-reproduction with the self-similar reasons of encoded self-consumption 
of the system. Since economic behavior is politically rational instead of economically, and 
power distribution rather than efficiency determines the constraints of self-reproduction of 
the system, the process of self-reproduction is simultaneously a process of self-consumption 
through the absolute and relative retreat of the network. In party-state systems described as 
networks characterized by self-similarity of the structure in time, space and aggregation 
levels we can  handle simultaneously the otherwise dichotomist dynamic concepts of center-
periphery, principal-agent, state-society, party-state, economy-politics, central 
authoritarianism-local federalism and central planning and local governance as different 
aspects of the same power relations that form the network.  
The IPS model deals with disparities of power distribution and its consequences both in 
time, in space and different levels of aggregation through the network. The model finds 
interrelation between structural patterns of power distribution their dynamics and the 
differences in the sequence, speed and condition of transformation. The model thereby is 
able to distinguish reforms, marketization and system transformation frequently taken as 
synonyms in comparative literature. Reforms in the model are instruments of self-
reproduction of the party-state system, be they within or outside the network, at the same 
time, they lead to the specific ways of self-consumption of the system; marketization is one  
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usual variant of the emergent field outside the network during the process of the 
transformation (retreat and emergence) of the economic sub-field; while transformation is a 
process of system change either with or without reforms, sudden, or gradual, in different 
sequence (economic or political transformation first) and different political and economic 
conditions, with different possible outcomes owing to different patterns of power 
distribution and different dominant pattern-conforming instruments of self-reproduction. 
Opposite to the usual comparative approach, the model interprets elite behavior, strategy 
implementation within the framework of structural constraints and path dependencies but 
also considering their mutual impact.  Thus, the model handles reforms from below, above, 
within authoritarian rule or in democracy a structurally determined condition rather than 
the elite’s ideal strategic choice. The model reflects the strong interrelation among self-
reproduction, retreat and emergence by linking the frequency of hardening constraints of 
self-reproduction, owing to the specifics of power distribution, to the dominant instruments 
of self-reproduction (forced resource extraction and redistribution, resource revealing, 
decentralizing reforms within the network and resource creating reforms outside the 
network). In this respect the model is able to deal simultaneously with decentralization of 
decisions within and outside the network, reforms and the lack of reforms by integrating 
them and their complex function according to power relations, and within those, in the 
different patterns of self-reproduction.  
The model takes external economic constraints (exerted by the field outside the net, 
either domestically or abroad), and internal structural constraints (depending on internal 
power distribution) simultaneously into consideration in their mutual dynamic impact on 
the system’s self-reproduction. All these impacts may occur in different stages of the 
reproduction dynamics: both during the period of self-reproduction and during 
transformation with different consequences. These same external and internal constraints 
combined with different time-span explain the differences to the reactions to adaptation 
pressures of the same patterns and that of different patterns.  
Based on the model, we can respond to the initial questions: party-states may be defined 
as politically monopolized networks that have common structural elements, connecting and 
operating principles. The network evolves changes and transforms through the interaction 
between party- state- and economic decision-makers, based on politically rational economic 
behavior. The specific distributions of power within this network will provide the structural 
background of differences in operation, adaptation, pattern shifts or transformations and 
outcomes. The same structural background is responsible for the different emergence, place 
of origin, speed, political context, and sequencing of reforms. Where economic 
transformation comes first, private sphere enhances macroeconomic growth and also 
provides external resources for the reproduction of the network and contributes to party 
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legitimacy. However, first economic or political transformation is not an issue of strategic 
choice but instead, of an issue of structural constraints. Similarly, such structural reasons 
will determine the impact of and reactions to external dynamics on operation, adaptation 
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